GOVERNANCE WATCH
By InsidEntity Editorial Desk · Sep 17, 2026 · 24 min read
Saudi Arabia and Aramco have told individual customers directly that some September cargoes are cancelled or delayed. Neither has publicly disclosed the scale of those changes. While European refiners absorb the shortfall, Aramco has offered additional crude to Asian buyers through an alternative loading route.
The same fortnight put the same shock through three other companies with very different registers. What each of them said about it tracks who owns it, and the ratings cannot tell two of them apart.
Status of this piece
This is a Spotlight paired with ratings.
Company Risk Rating: 3.64 | Financial Stability Rating: 4
| Pillar | Score |
|---|---|
| Director Independence | 5.00 |
| Director Capacity | 3.05 |
| Auditor Independence | 2.00 |
| Shareholder Influence | 4.50 |
| Composite, equal weights | 3.64 |
The pillars reconcile: (5.00 + 3.05 + 2.00 + 4.50) / 4 = 3.6375, rounding to 3.64. On the published scale, 3.64 sits in the Good band.
Equal weighting is the methodology’s default state, not a provisional workaround. It is in force until a director independence questionnaire is filed, at which point the published 40/20/20/20 weighting takes over with Director Independence carrying 40%. No questionnaire has been filed for Aramco’s board, so 3.64 is the current rating on the current inputs, and it is published as such.
Two qualifications belong with it. Director Independence is held at the benchmark 5.00, which is the value the methodology assigns in the absence of a questionnaire rather than a finding about Aramco’s directors, and a quarter of the composite rests on it. And because the weighting changes at the same moment that pillar is assessed, the composite moves when the questionnaire is filed even if every other pillar is confirmed unchanged: on the other three pillars as scored, the reweighted figure would be 3.91 if Director Independence returns 5.00 and 1.91 if it returns 0.00. Those are arithmetic bounds, not forecasts.
The FSR is scored from three years of full-year audited annual statements, not a single year in isolation, and answers a different question from board accountability.
What happened
Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Energy said its East-West pipeline, also called Petroline, was shut down as a precautionary measure after drone strikes hit pump stations in the Riyadh and Medina regions on 10 September, causing fires and injuries. Saudi and Iraqi authorities have said the drones came from Iraq. The ministry said technical teams were inspecting the line but did not say when pumping would restart.
The 1,200-kilometre pipeline carries crude from the eastern fields to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. It had been operating at up to 7 million barrels a day following a 2026 expansion, against a historical capacity of 5 million, and ship-tracking data has put actual throughput in the weeks before the attack closer to 4 to 5 million. Vessel-tracking data indicates no crude has left Yanbu since 11 September.
Petroline is usually described as the route that lets Saudi exports bypass the Strait of Hormuz. That description no longer holds, and the difference decides how this outage should be read. The strait has been effectively closed since 2 March, following US and Israeli strikes on Iran. Tehran declared it open on 17 April and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps reversed that a day later. Between 15 July and 23 August roughly five vessels a day transited, close to 95% below pre-war levels, and eight transits were recorded on 13 September against a pre-crisis baseline near 85 a day. Gulf crude exports have fallen about 47%, from roughly 17 million barrels a day in 2025 to about 9 million by August 2026.
Petroline was not a spare bypass on 10 September. It was one of the kingdom’s few functioning export pathways, and had been for six months. That is what makes a precautionary shutdown consequential rather than routine.
Market reporting indicates Saudi Arabia informed European customers directly that some September-loading cargoes would be cancelled. More specific reporting suggests at least three European refiners have had late-September cargoes cancelled outright or pushed back to November, with two more awaiting similar notice. One market source has estimated Yanbu’s remaining stocks at roughly five days of operations, a figure that could not be independently verified. Separate analysis has put Yanbu stockpiles below 15 million barrels, implying a buffer of four to seven days depending on export rate.
The notifications reached Asia too. At least one Asian customer with cargoes due to load this month received notice directly from Aramco that Yanbu shipments would be delayed and rescheduled, with no length specified.
Prices moved with the news. Brent futures traded near $108 a barrel, dated Brent around $122, and European physical cargoes above $130, with North Sea Forties at $136.75.
Poland’s Orlen, which sources roughly 40% of the crude for its Polish, Lithuanian and Czech refineries from Aramco term contracts, said on 16 September it had bought 16 additional cargoes from Norway, Great Britain, Algeria, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and the Americas to cover September and October demand. An August contract with Equinor for Johan Sverdrup crude covers roughly a quarter of its requirements on its own. At least four September tanker fixtures from Sidi Kerir to Gdansk failed. Orlen says its refineries remain fully supplied.
By 17 September the disruption had a second half. Saudi Arabia was reported to be offering additional Arab Light, Arab Medium and Arab Heavy to Asian term buyers for loading by ship-to-ship transfer off Oman’s Sohar port, outside the Strait of Hormuz, while doubling Gulf-side loadings at Ras Tanura and Juaymah.
Aramco has declined to comment on each of these reports, including in a direct response to a media inquiry on 16 September. The contrast with August is specific: reporting at the time indicated Aramco intended to supply European term customers their full contractual volumes for September.
Why this belongs in a governance file
A cargo delay caused by an attack on infrastructure is a security and logistics story. Notifying affected counterparties directly while staying silent with everyone else is not unusual mid-disruption.
What makes it worth filing here is who is positioned to ask the company for more.
As at 31 December 2025, Aramco reported Government ownership of 81.48%, other shareholdings including the Public Investment Fund, Sanabil and PIF-owned entities of 16.00%, treasury shares of 0.04%, and public ownership of 2.48%. State and state-linked ownership therefore stands at roughly 97.48%.
One figure in the same report invites misreading: international ownership of 27.06% refers to a share of the public investor base, not of the company.
So a listed company whose term customers are having cargoes cancelled has a public float of 2.48% to answer to, and the pillar meant to track board accountability to it is, on the record, still unassessed.
The Shareholder Influence score, and why it is 4.50
A public float of 2.48% is the kind of structure that might be expected to score weakly on a pillar named Shareholder Influence. It scores 4.50, in the Excellent band. That looks like a contradiction. It is not one, and the explanation is more interesting than the anomaly.
The pillar has two components: a shareholder-count component out of 3.0, and a concentration component out of 2.0. Aramco clears the count component in full, because the 2019 listing and the 2024 secondary left it with a very large number of individual holders. It then takes 1.5 of the available 2.0 on concentration, the score corresponding to one holder at or above the 20% material-influence threshold. Three plus 1.5 is 4.50.
The concentration component records whether the threshold is crossed, not by how much. A shareholder holding 21% and one holding 97.48% produce the same 1.5.
Sasol shows what the top of the scale looks like. Sasol scores 5.00. It is JSE and NYSE listed with a dispersed register and no holder at or above the threshold, so it takes the full 2.0 on concentration alongside 3.0 on count. The entire distance this pillar can travel between a company with no controlling shareholder and a company controlled outright by a sovereign is half a point, and the second still lands in the Excellent band.
BP shows that half a point does not separate them either. BP scores 4.50 on this pillar. Identical to Aramco.
BP is a FTSE-100 company with a fully dispersed register whose largest beneficial holder, BlackRock, sits near 9.2%, with Vanguard around 4.95%. Nobody is close to a 20% strategic position. On the component model a 4.50 corresponds to one recorded holder at or above the threshold, which on a London register of that size is characteristically a nominee or custodian line rather than an owner with intentions. That should be confirmed against BP’s register before the score is relied on, and it is in the open items below.
So on the pillar named Shareholder Influence, a company owned 97.48% by the Saudi state and a company owned by index funds and pension money score the same.
And BP is where shareholder influence was actually exercised. Elliott Management built a position of just over 5% and forced a wholesale strategic reversal: roughly $10 billion a year redirected into upstream oil and gas, more than $5 billion a year cut from transition spending. By early 2026 that had hardened into suspended buybacks, Meg O’Neill replacing Murray Auchincloss as chief executive from April 2026, and chairman Albert Manifold removed in May 2026 over conduct concerns, after close to a fifth of shareholders had already voted against his re-election.
Elliott built that position through equity swaps and derivative contracts, which carry no voting rights. On the share register, the most consequential shareholder in the sector was close to invisible. A register-based measure cannot see it, and did not.
The pillar therefore misses the same variable from both directions. At Aramco it records ownership conferring total control and no practical accountability. At BP it misses accountability exercised by a party holding almost nothing on the register. Both come out at 4.50.
Below the top of the scale, holder count drives the ranking. Across recent subjects the pillar runs Sasol 5.00, Aramco 4.50, BP 4.50, Dangote Refinery 3.00, Transnet 2.49, African Bank 2.00. Those are six different registers scored under one methodology, not a measured ranking of real-world influence. Aramco is by far the most concentrated and scores second, because it has by far the most shareholders. A holder count of that size is a real fact about a register. It is not the same fact as influence.
On the question the pillar is named for, a register that is 97.48% state and state-linked would be expected to sit near the bottom of the scale. It sits near the top.
That distance is the whole of this week’s story.
The other pillars
Auditor Independence scores 2.00, and the record behind it does not improve
PwC has audited Aramco continuously since at least the 2017 financial statements. Audit reports for 2017 and 2018 are reproduced in the company’s own 2019 base prospectus and IPO prospectus, both naming PricewaterhouseCoopers Public Accountants as independent auditor for those years. The 2020 base prospectus carries PwC’s reports for 2018 and 2019, and the 2019 consolidated statements were signed by PwC from its Dhahran office. Separate reporting from 2017 indicated Aramco’s named auditors had already audited the 2015 and 2016 accounts.
The ordinary general meeting of 11 May 2020 was therefore a re-appointment, not a start date. This matters beyond Aramco. Reading a re-appointment as the beginning of a relationship is the error that makes long audit tenures look short, and it is available in both directions: Westpac’s shareholders formally appointed PwC in 2002 while partners of PwC and its antecedent firms had audited the bank since 1968. The clock measures the engagement, not the paperwork renewing it.
Counting from the 2017 statements, the FY2025 audit was PwC’s ninth consecutive year, which is the eight-to-nine band and a score of 2.00. If the relationship runs from 2015, tenure has already passed ten years and the pillar sits in its terminal band at 0.00, taking the equal-weight composite to 3.14. Establishing which is correct is the one open item on this rating. A six-to-seven-year band, which would score 3.00, is not available on this record.
One forward-looking consequence follows. On a 2017 start, the engagement reaches ten years at the FY2027 audit, taking the pillar into its terminal band and the composite to 3.14. In 2021 the general assembly approved PwC for a ten-year term covering 2021 through 2030, with interim reviews to the first quarter of 2031. The filing records that Aramco’s bylaws permit an appointment of any length provided the lead audit partner rotates every five years, with a possible two-year extension. Partner rotation is a real safeguard and should be read as one. It is not a constraint on firm tenure.
So the pillar bottoms out around 2027 and then sits there for three further years, because the term securing the engagement runs to 2030. Absent a rotation, this score has a schedule. It steps down without anything happening at the company at all. On this pillar a zero is an assessed band, not an absent one.
The same pillar is reading two rule sets, not three
The comparison across jurisdictions is instructive, because it shows what the number is actually recording.
South Africa’s mandatory audit firm rotation rule would have barred a firm from serving a public interest entity for more than ten consecutive financial years. Sasol’s board cited that rule in March 2023 when announcing that PwC, in the seat since the 2014 financial year, would step down. On 31 May 2023 the Supreme Court of Appeal set the rule aside as ultra vires the Auditing Profession Act. KPMG took the seat on 1 July 2023, one month later, under Sasol’s own rotation policy rather than under compulsion. Sasol scores 5.00.
UK and EU law caps an engagement at twenty years and requires a competitive tender at least every ten. That produced BP’s tender and Deloitte’s appointment from financial year 2018 after decades of EY. Eight years in, BP scores 2.00.
Saudi rules impose no firm cap at all, only partner rotation. Aramco’s engagement runs from 2017 or earlier under a term extending to 2030. Aramco scores 2.00.
That leaves South Africa and Saudi Arabia in the same legal position: partner rotation only, no firm cap. The pillar still separates Sasol and Aramco by three full points.
BP and Aramco carry the same score for opposite reasons. BP’s clock was reset eight years ago by a regulator and will be reset again. Aramco’s has run for nine years and has no reset scheduled before 2031. The pillar reads the position, not the direction of travel, which is why the schedule above is worth publishing alongside the number.
Sasol’s benchmark score is also worth stating plainly, because the mechanics behind it cut against the easy reading. It does not exist because a regulator forced PwC out: the rule Sasol cited was struck down a month before KPMG took the seat. It exists because Sasol completed, under its own rotation policy, a rotation it was no longer legally obliged to finish. The pillar cannot distinguish a rotation completed under compulsion from one completed by choice, and would have recorded the same 5.00 either way.
Director Capacity scores 3.05. Director Independence at 5.00 is a placeholder, and the note at the top explains what happens when it becomes an assessment.
The allocation decision is the accountability question
The two halves of this week are usually reported separately and belong together. European term buyers were notified of cancellations and deferrals to November. Asian term buyers were offered additional Arab Light, Arab Medium and Arab Heavy through Sohar, with Gulf-side loadings doubled.
That is an allocation decision with commercial consequences for identified counterparties, taken during a supply disruption, and explained publicly nowhere. It is not improper. Term contracts differ, force majeure positions differ, and the physical geography of a Red Sea outage falls unevenly by construction: Yanbu serves the Mediterranean, and Sohar and the Gulf terminals do not.
The substitute route carries its own disclosure problem. Sohar sits outside the Strait of Hormuz, but crude loaded at Ras Tanura and Juaymah has to cross the strait to reach it. Reporting indicates the mechanism is the so-called dark shipment approach already used by the United Arab Emirates and Iraq, which has allowed Gulf producers to move 7 to 9 million barrels a day, roughly 30 to 40% of pre-war volumes, frequently with vessel tracking switched off. The workaround that keeps Asian buyers supplied is, by design, harder to observe than the flows it replaces.
If the question is who can require Aramco to explain itself, the answer this week is that the counterparties who lost volume were told privately and have contractual remedies at best, while the party that would ordinarily insist on a public account holds 2.48% of the register.
One shock, four registers
Sasol: a dispersed register, and a company that named the cause
Sasol closed its 2026 financial year on 30 June and reported on 1 September. Adjusted EBITDA rose 17% to R61 billion and EBIT 37% to R25.7 billion, with fuels EBIT more than tripling to R19.9 billion from R5.2 billion on higher volumes, crude prices and refining margins. Southern African oil breakeven fell to $49 a barrel. Secunda produced at a five-year high and Natref production rose 76%.
The structural point matters more than the numbers. Secunda is coal-to-liquids, so crude sets the price of what Sasol sells rather than the cost of what it buys. Natref is crude-fed, but Sasol adjusted operations to source more from Latin America and West Africa, reducing sour crude dependence, and its 2027 oil-hedging programme is complete. Sasol is structurally long the shock that has stranded Aramco’s barrels.
What Sasol did next is the part that belongs in a governance file. It named the closure of the Strait of Hormuz in its audited annual results, tied it to the fourth quarter, described how it had responded, and quantified the effect at an estimated $6 to $9 a barrel alongside the absence of a Secunda shutdown. Aramco has declined to comment on every aspect of its own disruption.
Sasol is not the well-governed counterpoint to three badly governed companies, and this is not an argument that disclosure follows virtue. It took R16.8 billion of impairments in 2026 on top of R20.7 billion the year before, including R7.7 billion against the Secunda liquid fuels cash generating unit where the full amount capitalised during the year was written off, and declared no final dividend because net debt remains above the $3 billion threshold. A company can disclose well and allocate capital poorly, and the ratings should be able to say both at once.
PetroSA: no register at all
The state-owned fuel company faces a liquidation application filed in the Western Cape High Court on 11 September, and a potential loss of R1.4 billion arising from a May 2025 settlement with the fuel trader Nako Energy.
PetroSA entered that meeting owed a net R227 million. It left having signed an acknowledgement of debt for R605 million that was ceded onward to Nako’s lenders, who have since demanded R620 million, and having agreed to buy eleven further cargoes of unleaded petrol at a cost put at R7.4 billion. The petrol was adulterated with N-methylaniline, an octane booster banned as a fuel additive in Europe, China and Russia but not in South Africa, and was pulled from Garden Route forecourts after it damaged customers’ paintwork. PetroSA declined to comment when the transactions were put to it.
The Middle East disruption touches PetroSA at the margin rather than the core. The R620 million demand is fixed in rand and a crude rally does not move it, and higher prices do not make adulterated petrol saleable into markets that reject the additive. Two effects are real. If the eleven cargoes are priced off a floating product index, as the agreed base-cost-minus-45-cents-a-litre formula suggests, the cost of discharging that obligation has risen with the market. And the political economy of allowing a state fuel company to fail changes when the strait is shut and landed product costs are climbing.
The ratings, side by side
| Pillar | Sasol | Aramco | BP |
|---|---|---|---|
| Director Independence | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 |
| Director Capacity | 2.91 | 3.05 | 2.92 |
| Auditor Independence | 5.00 | 2.00 | 2.00 |
| Shareholder Influence | 5.00 | 4.50 | 4.50 |
| Composite, equal weights | 4.48 | 3.64 | 3.61 |
| Financial Stability Rating | 3 | 4 | 2.3 |
Director Independence sits at the same 5.00 placeholder at all three, so no composite here reflects an assessed score on that pillar and all three move when questionnaires are filed.
| Aramco | Sasol | PetroSA | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Register | 97.48% state and state-linked; 2.48% public | JSE and NYSE listed, dispersed float | Wholly state-owned |
| Exposure | Long barrels, constrained route to market | Structurally long: coal-to-liquids plus hedging | Short: committed to cargoes it struggles to sell |
| What it disclosed | Declined to comment throughout | Named Hormuz in audited results, quantified the effect | Declined to comment |
| Who can compel an explanation | A 2.48% public float | Investors, analysts, two exchanges | Creditors, via a liquidation application |
The row to sit with is the composite. BP scores 3.61 and Aramco 3.64, a gap of three hundredths. One of those companies spent eighteen months being publicly disassembled by its own shareholders: a strategy reversed under activist pressure, a chief executive replaced, a chairman removed over conduct concerns, and a fifth of the register voting against him beforehand. The other declined to comment on a supply disruption affecting its term customers and has a public float of 2.48%.
It is not that the scores are wrong. Each pillar measures what it says it measures and the arithmetic reconciles at every company. It is that the two pillars where these companies genuinely differ come out identical, and the pillar where they differ on paper, Director Capacity at 3.05 against 2.92, is not carrying the distinction.
The Financial Stability Rating separates them where the governance rating does not: Aramco 4, Sasol 3, BP 2.3. That is a different question, answered from audited full-year statements, and on this occasion it is the more discriminating of the two numbers.
What separates these companies is not candour but the existence of a party with standing to insist. BP answers to a register that removed its chairman. Sasol answers to a dispersed register and two exchanges. PetroSA answers to a creditor holding a ceded acknowledgement of debt, which is accountability of a kind, just not the kind that produces public disclosure. Aramco, on the facts of this week, answers to a register that is 2.48% public, and has said nothing.
That is the variable the Shareholder Influence pillar is named for. Two of these companies score 4.50 on it, and they are the two furthest apart.
What is confirmed, and what is not
Confirmed from primary and market-source reporting. The 10 September attack and the precautionary shutdown, per the Saudi Ministry of Energy. No Yanbu crude exports since 11 September, per vessel-tracking data. Direct notification of European customers, per market reporting, and of at least one Asian customer. At least three European refiners with late-September cargoes cancelled or deferred to November, per market reporting. Orlen’s 16 replacement cargoes and its Equinor contract. The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz since 2 March and the transit and export volumes that followed. PwC’s audit of the 2017 and 2018 financial statements, per Aramco’s own prospectuses, and the ten-year appointment to 2030 per the 2021 general assembly filing. Aramco’s declining to comment, including directly to a media inquiry.
Reported by market sources, not independently verified. The five-day estimate of remaining Yanbu inventory. The sub-15-million-barrel stockpile figure and the buffer derived from it. The 17 September offers of additional crude to Asian buyers via Sohar.
Not established at all. Any public Aramco statement, press comment or market disclosure addressing the scale of the cancellations, the pipeline’s repair timeline, or the shift toward Asian allocations. Whether force majeure has been invoked under any affected term contract.
What we would want to see
- Force majeure status. Whether Aramco has invoked force majeure under any affected term contract, and if so when and to whom. This determines what the customer notices actually were. A force majeure declaration converts a commercial failure to deliver into a contractual non-event, suspending the obligation without breach. Absent one, a cancellation notice is a commercial communication and the buyer’s contractual position is unchanged.
- Public disclosure. Any disclosure to the Saudi Exchange addressing the outage, given that cancelled term cargoes are capable of being material.
- Repair timeline. The pipeline repair timeline and the extent of damage to the pump stations.
- Allocation basis. The basis on which September allocations were reduced for European term buyers while additional volumes were offered to Asian term buyers.
- Audit tenure start. The recorded start date of PwC’s continuous engagement, 2015 or 2017, which decides whether Auditor Independence is 2.00 or 0.00 and therefore whether the composite is 3.64 or 3.14.
- Tender intention. Whether Aramco’s audit committee intends to tender before the ten-year point, given the appointment period running to 2030.
- BP’s register. The identity of the recorded holder at or above 20% on BP’s register that produces its Shareholder Influence score of 4.50, given that its largest beneficial holder sits near 9.2%. If that line is a nominee or custodian rather than a strategic owner, the pillar is recording a settlement arrangement as a control position.
- PetroSA pricing. Whether the eleven-cargo obligation is priced off a floating product index or a fixed reference, which decides whether the current price environment raises the cost of discharging it.
The bottom line
Aramco’s counterparties know what is happening to their cargoes because they have been told. Investors have had to reconstruct the operational picture from customer notices, shipping data and unnamed market sources.
That establishes neither concealment nor that a public disclosure was legally required. It does expose a governance question: how much practical shareholder pressure exists when 2.48% of issued shares are classified as public.
The 4.50 Shareholder Influence score does not answer that question, and its components explain why it cannot. The methodology counts a large shareholder base and tests concentration against a single threshold. It does not measure the distance between a 20% controlling position and a 97.48% state and state-linked structure. The pillar that does carry a hard, dated record, Auditor Independence, points one way only, and is fixed on that path by a resolution running to 2030.
The same fortnight supplied the control cases, and they are more damaging to the instrument than to any of the companies. A dispersed register produced a named disclosure and a quantified effect. No register at all produced a liquidation application. A register that removed its own chairman scored 4.50. A register that is 2.48% public, and said nothing, scored 4.50 as well, and finished three hundredths of a point ahead on the composite.
That is worth publishing rather than smoothing over. A rating that cannot separate those two registers is telling you something true about its own construction, and the honest response is to say so in the same document that carries the number.
That gap is what this Spotlight is examining, and it is a gap in the instrument before it is a gap in the company.
Independent research. Not financial advice. Statements attributed to market or shipping-data sources are reported as such and are not established findings. No allegation of wrongdoing is made against any individual or entity named.
Know more. Risk less. Decide better.
Sources: Saudi Arabia Ministry of Energy statement on the East-West pipeline shutdown; Saudi Aramco Annual Report 2025 (shareholding composition as at 31 December 2025); Saudi Aramco IPO prospectus 2019 and GMTN base prospectuses 2019 and 2020 (independent auditor’s reports, 2017 to 2019); Saudi Exchange filing on the appointment of an external auditor for the ten-year period ending 31 December 2030; Sasol audited financial results for the year ended 30 June 2026 and accompanying presentation; Sasol annual financial statements 2024 and 2025 and SENS announcement on the appointment of KPMG; Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors rule on mandatory audit firm rotation; BP announcement of 15 November 2016 proposing Deloitte as auditor from financial year 2018; liquidation application filed in the Western Cape High Court, 11 September 2026.
Note on figures: Throughput, inventory and stockpile figures are as reported by market sources and vessel-tracking providers and have not been independently verified. Shareholding percentages are as reported in Aramco’s 2025 annual report as at 31 December 2025. The Auditor Independence band of 2.00 is consistent with a PwC engagement dating from the 2017 financial year, the earliest year for which the company’s own prospectus reproduces a PwC audit report; an engagement dating from 2015, as some reporting suggests, would place the pillar in its terminal band and the composite at 3.14. A six-to-seven-year band is not available on this record. Sasol figures are as reported in its audited results for the year ended 30 June 2026. PetroSA and Nako Energy figures are as reported in investigative coverage of the matter; PetroSA declined to comment and no finding of wrongdoing is made. Sasol’s ratings of 4.48 and 3, and BP’s of 3.61 and 2.3, are as published. The attribution of BP’s 4.50 Shareholder Influence score to a recorded holder at or above the 20% threshold follows from the published component model and should be confirmed against BP’s register. Pillar scores are as at the date of publication and update as corporate information changes.